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The U.S. has significant interests involved in the world debt problem. It
affects the profitability and even the stability of our banking system, but the
debt problem also matters because debt service requires trade surpluses for debt-
ors. Debtor countries have made their goods extra competitive, are selling in
our market and are competing with our exports. The debt problem is therefore a
part, though perhaps a small part, of the U.S. trade crisis. Finally we have a
major foreign policy stake in the debt crisis in that debt collection brings
about social and political instability.
The paper sets out debt facts, followed with a brief look at the origins of
the debt problem. The "transfer problem" is the general framework in which we
discuss the problem of debt service for the debtor countries. We then discuss
bank exposure and the quality of debts. The paper then addresses the trade
implications of debt service and concludes with an overview of alternative pro-
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This paper deals with the U.S. interest in the world debt problem. We
have a major stake in the debt problem because it affects the profitablity and
even the stability of our banking system. But it also matters because debt
service requires trade surpluses for debtors. We are now experiencing the
reverse side of the coin from collecting debt: debtor countries, having made
their goods extra competitive are selling in our market and are competing with
our exports. The debt problem is therefore a part, though perhaps a small
part, of the US trade crisis. Finally we have a major foreign policy stake in
the debt crisis in that debt collection brings about social and political
instability.
-
Thepaper reviews these various aspects of the debt problem. Section 1
sets out debt facts, followed in section 2 with a brief look at the origins
of the debt problem. That issue is important in laying the groundwork for
solutions that involve sharing the adjustment. The "transfer problem" is the
general framework in which we discuss the problem of debt service for the
debtor countries in section 3. Section 4 deals with bank exposure and the
quality of less developed countries' (LDCs) debts. The U.S. trade implications
of the debt crisis are briefly addressed in section 6. The paper concludes
with an overview of alternative proposals for solving the debt problem.
'Paperprepared for the volume on The U.S. in the World Economy,
?LFeldstein (ed.), to be published by the NBER. I am indebted to Eliana
Cardoso, Martin Feldstein, Stanley Fischer and Simon Johnson for many
helpful comments and suggestions.2
1. DEBT FACTS
In this section we provide an overview of debt facts: in the aggregate
and in country detail, who owes whom how much, with what maturity, and in
which currency.2
An Overview
Table 1 shows aggregate debt data for selected years both in current
and constant dollars. There is a problem in finding a suitable deflator for
the world economy. Possible candidates are the U.S. GNP deflator, or either
import or export prices for LDCs. We select instead the price (export unit
value) of industrial countries' exports as a broader price index of trends in
the world economy. World trade prices since 1980 have declined, and even in
1986 are below their 1980 level. Accordingly this index behaves very
differently from, for example, the U.S. deflator which has been steadily
increasing.
Since 1978 LDC debt has increased by 142 percent in nominal terms and
88 percent in real terms. In these aggregate data we observe the slowdown of
debt growth since 1982 and the effect of changing trends in world prices with
inflation in the early period and deflation since 1980.
2There is a lot of flux in debt data. A good survey of the problems can
be found in Mills (1986). We use here the IMF data, data reported by
Morgan Guaranty World Financial Markets and the US country exposure
survey except where otherwise noted.
3The classification of countries follows the IMF. See World Economic
Outlook, October l986,pp.31—34.3
Table 1Capital Importing LDC Debt
(Billion $U.S. and Billion 1980 dollars)
1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1986
% Share
Total 399 570 763 849 967 100.0
Africa 72 94 117 128 144 14.9
Asia 93 135 180 212 265 27.4
Europe 48 68 77 82 101 10.4
Non-Oil
Middle East 30 43 56 68 75 7.8
Western
Hemisphere 156 231 333 359 383 37.5
Total (1980 Prices)a 523 578 822 974 987 —
a Deflatedby industrial countries' unit export value.
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook and IFS
-
Asecond perspective is provided by looking at debt relative to some
scale variable. The most common scale variables are exports of goods and
services and GD?. Table 2 shows debt relative to GD?.
Table 2Debt GD? Ratios
(Percent)
Africa AsiaEurope Non—Oil LEastWestern Hemisphere
1978 32.2 15.9 23.7 52.9 31.8
1982 36.3 21.5 30.8 66.6 43.5
1986 44.3 30.0 40.0 63.2 47.0
Memo: Cumulative Real GDP Growth 1982-86
4.2 31.1 11.4 —0.3 5.5
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook4
The most interesting point made by this data is that differences, at
least at this aggregate level, are minor. Latin America is normally singled
out as the problem case. But on a debt—income basis non—oil Middle east
countries stand out as having an even larger burden. The other point to note
is the deterioration in debt ratios since 1982. This is surprising when one
sees banks today rationing credit. The explanation lies primarily in the fact
that GD? in U.s. dollars has declined for most debtor countries as a result of
large real depreciation.4
There is another interesting presentation of debt—income ratios,
singling out different groupings of countries. Interestingly small, low—income
countries have a higher debt/GD? ratio (64.0 %) than net oil imports (35.3%)
or the grpup of problem debtors (46.6 %).Thuscountries in a group with
Afghanistan and Bangladesh have higher debt ratios than the group including
Brazil and Mexico. We shall see below that this does not translate into higher
debt burdens since much of the poor countries' debt is concessional.
Short, Long, Official and Private Debt
The maturity structure of the debt is primarily medium—term.
Throughout the period 1978-86 the share of short-term debt (less than one year
maturity) in total debt of all capital importing LDCs never exceeded 20
percent. But, of course, there are significant differences between countries.
The larger borrowing from commercial banks the shorter the maturity of debt.
In the period to 1982 there was an increase in the share of short—tern debt,
reflecting the increasing recourse to commercial bank financing. But since
4Note that real GD? and dollar GDP behave very differently. A real
depreciation may raise real GD? but is certain to lower dollar GD?.S
then, with rescheduling and increased official lending the share of short—tern
debt has declined from 20 percent to only 13 percent. Since most debtors are
not in a position to amortize their debts the distinction between short and
long—term debt is becoming increasingly irrelevant.
Table 3 shows the share of debt to official creditors in total debt.
The table reports the data for various regions.
Table 3 Share of Long—term Debt to Official Crediors in Total Debt
(Percent of Total)
Africa Asia Europe Non—Oil Western
Middle East Hemisphere
1978 34.0 54.9 27.6 57.6 15.9
1982 38.9 42.5 30.7 58.5 12.4
1986 48.6 43.5 33.3 58.5 20.3
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook
The differences among country groupings in their funding is quite
striking. Latin America stands out as borrowing from private sources a very
much larger share than the remaining countries. But there is also an
interesting difference in the behavior over time. For Latin America and Africa
the absolute and relative increase in official credit since 1982 is much more
substantial than for other regions. In 1985, for example, commercial bank
exposure declined in absolute terms while official exposure, especially of
multilateral agencies, increased.
Debt Service Burdens
The burden of debt service is made up of interest payments and
amortization. As such it is affected by three factors:6
.The maturity profile of debt which dicatates the amount of
amortization in a given year. Any bunching of maturities would translate into
large year—to—year fluctuations in debt service.
.Interest rates on the debt. This factor depends on the private—
official composition of the debt. Official debt may be concessional and long—
term while private typically involves floating rate interest payments.
.Debt service measured relative to some benchmark such as exports or
GDP. The benchmark is affected by the country's real exchange rate. Real
depreciation, as already nioted above, will reduce real GDP in dollars and
hence raise the debt income ratio. Measuring debt relative to exports imples
that changes in the value of exports, say as a result of exchange rate policy
or as a consequence of changes in world commodity prices, will affect the debt
export ratio.
The distinction between long and short—term debt, in an environment of
universal rescheduling, is becoming quite uninteresting. We thus focus only on
interest payments. Table 4 shows debt service measured by interest payments as
a fraction of debt, GD?, and exports. We again focus on the geographical
distribution.
Table 4 LDC Interest Payments: 1986
Africa Asia Europe Non—Oil Western
Middle East Hemisphere
Percent of 6.8 5.8 8.0 7.3 8.4
Debt
Percent of 3.0 1.7 3.2 4.6 3.9
GD?
Percent of 14.4 6.1 10.8 17.0 27.7
Exports
Source: INF World Economic Outlook7
The first row makes apparent the difference in effective interest
rates paid. Africa and Asia have a significantly larger share of concessional
loans and accordingly interest payments as a fraction of debt are in excess of
2 percentage points less than for Latin America. As a benchmark we can compare
the effective interest rate with the L,ibor rate, which in 1985—86 averaged 7.8
percent. Divergences of the effective rate from Libor reflects concessional
loans and the spreads above Libor on commercial bank loans.
The interest burden as a fraction of GDP shows Africa and Europe in
the middle range, a low figure for Asiaand high indebtedness for Latin America
and the non—oil middle east with high indebtedness. Differences between the
GD? and export—based comparisons reflect economic structure. Europe is wide
open while Latin America is much more closed. Latin America's export to GD?
ratio is much lower than that for Asia, for example.
The difference between debtors with commercial and those with
concessional debt becomes particularly apparent when comparing effective
interest payments. While the effective interest rate for small, low—income
countries in 1986 averaged 3.4 percent, for the remaining groups it was
between 6.9 and 8.7 percent.
Currency Denomination
The currency composition of lending to LDCs is not well documented.
There is little doubt that the major part of loans, perhaps 60 to 70 percent,
is in U.s. dollars. The denomination issue is very important since large
fluctuations of real exchange rates between the U.S., Europe and Japan involve
changing burdens of real debt and changing bank exposure.8
Since February 1985 the dollar has declined in world markets by more
than fifty percent relative to key currencies. Over the same period prices of
industrial countries' exports which we might use as an index of prices in
world trade have fallen only 5 percent while prices of commodities exported by
LDCs fell 7 percent over the 1982—86 period. For debtor countries the movement
of the dollar thus did not carry significant conmsequences if they were
entirely denominated in dollars. If, however, a significant part was
denominated in Yen or in European currencies the vast exchange rate movements
would have meant an increase in real debt burdens.5
Major Problem Debtors
We conclude the review of facts with a listing of major problem
debtors. This group of countries corresponds to the "15 heavily indebted
countries" Table 5 shows their total debts, interest payments and debt per
capita.
5This increase in real debt burdens would have outpaced any advantages
from cumulatively lower interest rates on non—dollar debt. As is well—
known exchange rate movements have far exceeded the depreciation
implicit in international interest differentials.9
Table 5 15 Heavily Indebted Countries
Country Debta Debt Interest/GD? Share of Debt
per capitab Ratioc to Private Creditors
Argentina 50.8 1662 7.9 86.8
Bolivia 4.0 622 10.0 39.3
Brazil 107.3 791 5.8 84.2
Chile 21.0 1740 12.9 87.2
Colombia 11.3 395 3.3 57.5
Ecuador 8.5 906 6.0 73.8
Ivory Coast 8.0 846 8.7 64.1
Mexico 99.0 1261 6.3 89.1
Morocco 14.0 842 8.2 39.1
Nigeria 19.3 210 1.9 88.2
Peru 13.4 680 10.8 60.7
Phillipines 24.8 456 6.2 67.8
Uruguay 3.6 1204 9.8 82.1
Venezuela 33.6 2000 8.1 99.5
Yugoslavia 19.6 848 na 64.0
aBjilion $ US, b thousand S US, Cinterestpayments on the external debt as a
percent of GDP.
Source: Fortune Dec. 23, 1985 and Economist Sept. 27, 1986, International
Financial Statistics, and World Bank (1986).
In this table Chile, Peru, and Bolivia are shown as having the highest
debt/GD? ratio while Chile, Argentina, and Mexico show the highest per capita
debt figures. Bolivia and Morocco are interesting in that their debts are
predominantly to official creditors. Finally Nigeria is of interest because of
the relatively low per capita debt by comparison with the other countries.
3. THE ORIGINS OF THE DEBT PROBLEM
In this section we review where the debt problem stems from. Three
facts combined to produce the debt crisis of 1982. The proportions vary from
one case to another, but in almost all instances there is a combination of the
following factors:10
• Poor macroeconomic policies of debtor countries. These include
specifically overvaluation of their currencies.
• The downturn in the world economy, involvingsharply higher interest
rates and lower growth.
• Initial overlending and subsequent credit denial by commercial
banks.
We now review these factors in turn.
Domestic Mismanagement
In the late 1970s debtor countries worldwide, with rare exceptions,
embarked on policies inducing currency overvaluation. The policies were
motivated by a single purpose: to contain and reduce stubborn inflationary
pressure. The popularity of the policy, in the shortterm, stems from the fact
that real wages increase. The increase in real wages translates only gradually
into lower employment. Hence there is a period of euphoria as standards of
living are artificially inflated by the real appreciation while the resulting
external imbalance is financed via reserve depletion and external borrowing.
Table 6 Real Exchange Rates
(index 1980—82 =100)
Argentina Brazil Chile MexicoVenezuela Korea
1976—78 73 116 75 98 95 92
1979 101 96 79 98 94 95
1980 116 85 95 104 93 96
1981 107 103 108 114 100 101
1982 76 112 97 82 110 103
1983—85 74 85 86 86 98 96
Source: Morgan Guaranty World Financial Markets11
Each of the countries in Table 6 showed some real appreciation in
1979—82 as indicated by an increase in the real exchange rate index. For
example in Argentina the rera]. exchange rate moves from a value of 73 in 1976—
78 to 116 in 1980. Not all cases were as extreme and the annual averages
conceal some of the even higher peaks. But the basic point is that most debtor
countries, sometime in 1979—82, experienced real appreciation of some degree.
The exact timing of real appreciation differs but the story is
invariably the same. There are, however, significant differences in the
magnitude of overvaluation. Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Venezuela have much
more extreme experiences than Brazil or Korea. Brazil is interesting because
its policy of using (normally) a crawling peg geared to the US—Brazil economy—
wide inflation differentials assured that high productivity growth in
tradeab].es translates into a steady real depreciation. Dollar depreciation
reinforces the gain in competitiveness in the late 1970s, but when the dollar
strenghtens in the 1980—2 period competitiveness is lost. In Korea's case the
real appreciation was very shortlived and, in fact quite minor compared to say
Argentina.
The particular details of mismanagement differ between countries. For
concreteness we look at Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
Argentina: Under Finance Minister Martinez de Hoz in the post-Peronist
military government inflation was reduced from more than 600 percent in 1976
to less than 200 percent by 1978. But further inflation reduction was hard to
achieve. A large budget deficit was an obvious reason. Yet the government
preferred to focus on the inflation—depreciation spiral and the role of
expectations.12
Appealing to the law of one price, and the critical role of
expectations, the government implemented in December 1978 a policy of
preannouncing the rate of exchange depreciation. The preannounced 'tablita'
showed a steady deceleration of the rate of depreciation, and this was
actually implemented. But inflation reduction was very slow. Hence the real
exchange rate became steadily overvalued.6 Even so the policy was continued
until March 1981 when it ultimately broke down.
The consequences for debt of overvaluation came primarily from the
side of the capital account. Argentina had liberalized international capital
flows entirely. As a result residents, aware of the growing overvaluation,
could freely shift into foreign assets, ranging from dollar bills to foreign
deposits and securities or real estate. The extreme overvaluation, reaching
more than 40 percent, led to large scale capital flight. The government
borrowed in New York, using the proceeds to sustain the exchange rate along
its preannounced path. The public bought dollars and redeposited them in the
very same banks from which the government had borrowed. And that process
continued, in the fullest knowledge of all concerned until a change in the
military government led to a collapse of the policy.
My estimate of Argentine capital flight in the period 1978—82 is $23
billion, not counting unrepatriated interest earnings which would raise the
figure to well above $30 billion.
Chile: The Pinochet government instituted free market reforms and fiscal
orthodoxy in Chile. These included elimination of tariffs and quotas and a
6See Dornbusch (1984,1986a) on the Martinez de Hoz experiment.13
balancing of the budget.7 But inflation, while sharply reduced from the near
hyperinflation levels of 1972—74 would not disappear. By 1979, with inflation
the only major economic problem, the government fixed the exchange rate. The
rate was fixed at 39 pesos/S even though inflation was still near 30 percent,
way above world inflation, and wages were indexed in a backward looking
fashion.
Not surprisingly the exchange rate became increasingly overvalued.
Wage increases far outpaced world inflation and thus the real exchange rate
appreciated steadily. In the short—run the policy was popular since it raised
living standards. But it became increasingly apparent that there was an
unsustainable overvaJ.uation was accumulating. By 1981 the system started to
unravel. The public responded in their accustomed way. Taking advantage of
what was perceived to be a very transitory "sale" of imports the entire
country participated in the flight into imports (in particular durables).
The real exchange rate appreciated by more than 25 percent between
1978 and 1981. The value of imports increased by 50 percent. Import volume
indices tell an extraordinary story: breeding stock +328 %,automobiles+226
%,electrodomestic equipment +156%. The Chilean example highlights that
especially in the case of producer and consumer durables a transitory exchange
rate overvaluation has major effects on the timing of purchases. The
government was not deterred by these developments. Steadfastedly, the
authoritiers maintained the exchange rate and asserted that the exchange rate
policy was visibly successful as evidenced by the declining rate of inflation.
70n the Chilean experiment see Edwards and Edwards (1987) and Ramos
(1986)14
As in all other cases the policy ultimately broke down. Tariffs are
back today and so are quotas. Inflation is back to the point where the
adventure started. The lasting difference is an extraordinary debt burden and
extremely high unemployment. We return to these issues below.
Mexico: The large increase in oil prices during 1978/79 would lead one to
expect that Mexico should have done well. But even with sharply increased
revenues from oil the currrent account deteriorated in the period 1979—81 from
$5 to $13 billion. At the same time there was a major outflow of capital. B
An estimate by Morgan Guaranty places the amount of capital flight
during 1976—82 at $36 billion while a World Bank estimate for 1979—82 gives
$26.5 billion.9 The extent of capital flight is associated with a peculiarly
Mexican institution: the 6th and final year of the presidency. 1982 was such a
year and people expected, correctly, that overvaluation and an excess of
spending would ultimately lead to a balance of payments crisis. Under these
circumstances capital flight became extreme.
Brazil: The Brazilian case is special in that the policy mistakes nay well
have been minor. Brazil certainly ran very large budget deficits. Oil price
increases and increased world interest rates were absorbed by the public
sector deficit and the resulting external deficit was financed by increased
borrowing abroad. But it turns out that much of the earlier borrowing by state
enterprises, especially in the 1972—78 period, financed a massive national
investment effort. 10
80n the Mexican case see Cardoso and Levy (1986)
9Morgan Guaranty World Financial Markets, March 1986 and World
Development Report, 1986..
'°On Brazil see Cardoso (1986).15
In Brazil's case tight restrictions on imports, and the near—absence
of capital flight made for an experience very different frtorn that of
Argentina, Mexico or Chile. The chief source of debt accumulation was the
public sector. This meant that the damage was much more limited than was the
case in the other countries. Indeed, by early 1985 it seemed that lopwer
interest rates and a sharply reduced oil price helped solve Brazil's debt
problems for the major part. Since then the current acxcount has once again
deteriorated, in part as a result of an overly expansionary policy. But even
so Brazil is among the debtor countries who are more likely to be able to
sustain growth and debt service.
The World Macro—economy
A major part in the origins of the debt crisis was played by the sharp
downturn in the world economy during 1979—81. In the 1970s, partly as a result
of the oil shocks, but also because of overexpansionary policies, the U.S. had
experienced increasing inflation. In 1979—81, under the pressure of the
collapsing dollar, U.S. policies changed sharply. The full—employment budget
was cut by
nearly 1.5 percentage points of GNP. Nominal interest rates were allowed to
rise from 9 percent in 1978 to 17 percent in 1981 and real interest rates
increased sharply.
The sharp change in the world economic environment is brought out in
Table 7 which compares the early 1970s and the period preceding the debt
crisis. The early 1970s favored debtors: strong growth, high inflation and low
interest rates. By comparison, in 1980—82 inflation was low, interest rates
were extraordinarily high, and growth was stagnant.16
Table 7Key Macroeconomic Variables of the World Economy
(Annual percentage rates)
Libor Inflationa OECD Growth
Manufactures Commodities
1970—73 7.6 12.4 14.4 5.9
1980—82 14.7 —2.4 —13.3 0.9
alnflation rate in world trade
Source: IMF IFS and World Bank Commodity Trade and Price Trends
It is particularly important in this context to see the real interest
rate issue. For debtor LDCs the US real intererst rate is hardly appropriate.
An alternative is provided by the inflation rate in world trade. We note that
manufactures prices were declining by 2.4 while commodity prices fell by 13.3
percent per year. Any realistic estimate of real interest rates cannot fail to
come up with extraordinarily high rates.
It is worth noting that commodity price developments have different
effects depending whether a particular debtor is a net exporter or a net
importer of commodities. The point is important in a comparison of Korea and
Latin America. Korea (like Japan, for example) is a net importer of
commodities. As a result the collapse of commodity prices in 1979—81 helped
offset in part at least the oil price increase. Brazil, by contrast is a net
exporter of commodities and has a production structure which makes her
vulnerable to oil price increases and commodity price decreases. Table 8
shows terms of trade changes and highlights the very different experience of
various debtor groups.17
Table 8 Terms of Trade Changes: 1978—82
(Cumulative Percentage Change)
Fuel 15 Heavy Small Low—Income Non—Oil L.DCs Net Oil
Exporters Debtors Countries ExportersImporters
54.5 7.9 —27.8 18.2 —20.1
IMF World Economic Outlook
These world economic developments meant that most LDCs experienced a
sharp deterioration in their current accounts. Reduced export revenues, on
account of the decline in commodity prices and world recession, were
reinforced by sharply increased nominal debt service burdens. Thus debtors
were made illiquid. To continue on the accustomed course external financiang
needed to increase sharply. The lack of smooth financing in the case of Mexico
then brought on generalized credit rationing.
Overlending and Credit Rationing
In the period to mid—1982 reckless lending was the rule. It is
possible today to look search the 1980—81 discussion of debt problems for
warnings of the crisis to come. The Bank for International Settlements had
expressed concern at least since 1978. A Group of Thirty enquiry in 1981
sought to uncover whether banks felt debt was a major issue and failed to find
dominant concern.'' In a survey of 100 banks the question was posed "Last time
no serious debt defaults arose. This time do you think that a general debt
problem affecting countries is likely to emerge.. ?"Inresponse 72 percent of
the banks questioned expressed the view that a debt crisis was not likely, 13
''See Group of Thirty (1981) and Kraft (1984).18
percent thought it might possibly happen and only 15 percent replied in the
affirmative.'2
But if there were perhaps some concerns, they were certainly not
enough to stop a final lending boom. Table 9 shows Latin America's current
account deficit and its financing. Between 1979 and 1981 private lending to
Latin America exactly doubles. It is not clear how these credits were
justified at the time. There were two arguments. One was the need for
recycling which had worked well at the time of the first oil shock. The other
was the lack of information on country exposure. Neither of course is a
reasonable explanation.
Table 9 Latin America: Current Account Imbalances and Financing
(Billion U.S. $)
CurrentAccount Borrowing
Official Creditorsa Private Creditors
1978 19.4 2.2 25.8
1979 21.8 2.7 27.4
1980 30.2 6.1 35.9
1981 43.3 6.5 54.1
1982 42.0 14.6 28.8
1983 11.4 17.7 2.0
1984 4.9 10.7 7.0
1985 5.9 5.1 —0.6
aincluding reserve—related liabilities. Private capital flows (flight) and
errors and omissions make up the difference in the row sums.
Source: INF World Economic Outlook
Subsequent to overlending was credit rationing following the Mexican
moratorium of August 1982. As shown in Table 9 private lending fell off
dramatically, and in 1985, even turned negative. The credit rationing
12See Group of Thirty (198Th).19
phenomenon is not surprising; faced with a country's inability to meet debt
service each individual lender is reluctant to put up money which would only
serve to pay other banks' claims. Hence without a cartel there is no lending.
But if there is no lending then, of course, debt service is impossible and
hence debtors will default.
The problem in 1982 was therefore to develop a system that would
organize creditors. They would have to provide the part of debt service that
could not be extracted by improvements in debtor country external balances. At
the same time the cartel would serve, much as the occupation of customs houses
in the old days, to extract a maximum of debt service by a lien on the debtor
countries' macroeconomic policies. The IMF, having been ignored in the 1970s,
eagerly (and skillfully) assumed the task of orchestrating debt collection,
fiscal discipline, and forced lending.
3. THE TRANSFER PROBLEM AND DEBT SERVICE FATIGUE'3
We now ask why debt service appears to be such a major problem. In one
sense the answer is quite straightforward: countries that used to spend,
borrowing the resources from official and private creditors (with little
thought of how to service or even less repay the loans), now no longer command
these resources: they are limited to spending.The adjustment is complicated
by two facts. The first is the macroeconomics of earning foreign exchange, the
second is the political economy problem of finding extra budget resources for
debt service. These issues are familiar from the discussion of German
'3This section draws on Dornbusch (1985,1986).20
reparation payments following World War 1.14 Exactly the same issues arise in
the context of the involuntary debt service now underway.
The Reduction in Spending: The first issue is how a country adjusts to a
reduction in its spendable resources. Before the debt crisis foreign loans
supplemented domestic income, enlarging the resources that could be spent.
Interest payments on loans were automatically provided in the form of new
money and the principal on debts was automatically rolled over. With managing
the debt so easy, and with ready access to resources beyond what was required
to service the debt, spending ran high. After credit rationing begain in 1982,
spending had to be limited, and absorption fell below the level of output as
interest now had to be paid out of current production. Interest payments now
had to be earned by noninterest surplusses in the current account.
Table 10 shows the debt service process at work. In the post—1982
period of involuntary lending debtor countries have achieved a shift in their
noninterest external balance of nearly 5 percent of GDP. This external balance
improvement serves to make net transfers of interest to the creditors. It is
matched by a nearly equal reduction in investment in the debtor countries.
Table 10 Latin America: Investment and the External Noninterest Surplus
(Percent of GDP)
1977—82 1983—85 Change
Gross Investment 24.3 18.5 —5.8
Noninterest External Surplus —0.6 4.7 5.3
Source: INF World Economic Outlook
'4See especially Fraga (1986) for a comparison between Germany in the
1920s and Brazil in the l980s. See,too, Dornbusch (1985).21
This perverse resource transfer, of course, cones at theexpense of
living standards in the developing countries. But more importantly the
transfer has as a counterpart a sharp decline in investment. Interestpayments
thus are really financed by a mortgage on future standards of living andon
the debtors' growth potential. In countries where population growth ishigh
and income distribution is appaling such a policymay turn out to be very
shortsighted.
But there remained the issue of how to distribute the cut in spending
between its various components: government, consumption, and investment. Aswe
saw above a large part of the cut took the form of reduced investment. But
there was, of course, also a decline in consumption. A fall in investmentwas
not enough has due to two special features of the adjustmentprocess. First,
cutting total demand has macroeconomic multiplier effects that translate into
a reduction in output, income, and hence private spending. Second, at the same
time as involuntary debt service started there also occurred a deterioration
in the world economy which required an extra downward adjustment in spending.
The Foreign Exchange Problem: The second macroeconomic issue in adjusting to
debt concerns the fact that the country needs to earn dollars, not pesos. In
other words it needs to generate a trade surplus. The cut in spending will, of
course, reduce import demand and also free exportables for sale abroad, but
for two reasons that will not be enough. First, a sizeable fraction of the
expenditure cut will fall on domestic (nontraded) goods, not tradeables. The
spending cut thus creates directly unemployment rather than potential foreign22
exchange earnings. Even for those goods that are directly tradeable it is not
necessarily the case that increased supplies can be sold. Often there is the
problem of obtaining market access and, if the goods are not homogeneous
commodities like cotton or copper, a cut in their price is required to realize
increased sales. Even then, unless demand is sufficently responsive, total
earnings may not increase.
To translate the spending cut into foreign exchange earnings, a gain
in competitiveness is required. The gain in competitiveness draws resources
into the tradeable goods sector and in the world market makes it possible to
sell the increased production of tradeable goods. Of course, the only way to
gain competitiveness is by reducing the wage in dollars by a real
depreciation. But the real wage cut also generates, at least in the shortrun,
increased unemployment as the spendable income of workers is cut. The size of
the required cut in real wages deserves further comment. It is larger the
larger the share of trade goods in income and the smaller the share of wages
in GD?.
The overwhelming difficulty in the adjustment process is that external
adjustment via a gain in competitiveness reduces employment. The dominant
effect on employment is from the reduction in real wages and the resulting
reduction in domestic demand. The positive employment response that would be
expected in the tradeable goods sector from the gain in competitiveness is
often very weak and slow. One of the reasons for this is that expectations of
a sustained change in competitiveness do not take hold immediately. The
traded goods sector thus adopts a wait—and—see attitude, which makes real
depreciation a highly precarious policy tool. The Mexican experience in this
respect is particularly instructive.23
A second important difficulty arises from the world—wideadjustment to
forced debt service. Since most debtor countrieswere overspending in the
early 1980's, and are now under a forced debt service regime, they all hadto
resort to real depreciation to enhance their competitiveness. But thatmeans
they are competitively cutting their wages relative to each other, andnot
only relative to those of the creditor countries. As a resultan isolated
country, cutting its dollar wage say by 50 percent, will gain much less in
terms of increased dollar revenues because all thecompeting LDCs are doing
much the same.
The Budget Problem: The third macroeconomic problem inthe adjustment process
involves the budget. Much of the external debt is publicor publicly
guaranteed. Of the part that was not initially, much has woundup in the
public sector in the aftermath of the crises, as a result of bank failures.
The government thus winds up having to service a debt which beforewas either
in private hands or automatically serviced bynew money. The problem, of
course, is where to find the extra three or four percent of budget revenue
that will pay these new interest costs.
There are basically four avenues: raising taxes and public sector
prices, reducing government outlays, printingmoney, or issuing domestic debt.
Raising taxes is notoriously difficult since most of the taxesare already
levied in the form of social security taxes on workers. An easiersolution is
to raise public sector prices or to eliminate subsidies. The eliminationof
subsidies is particularly cheered by creditors and internationalagencies
since it means moving closer to efficient resource allocation.1Of course,
'5The fact that it is often food subsidies thatare eliminated, without
the proverbial neutral lumpsum tax, to compensate the losersdoes not
seem to limit the case for the policy recommendation.24
the imposition of extra taxes or the withdrawal of subsidies is inevitably
inflationary from the price side unless the tax increase or subsidy cut is
offset by a reduction in other prices or wages. Of course, via the revenue
side reduces the growith in money and hence, in combination, it leads to a
recession with inflationary pressure sustained by prevailing inflation.
Cutting government spending is another option. Attention here focusses
on the often extreme inefficiency of the public sector. The public perceives
that there must be a way to pay the bills out of increased efficiency, rather
than reduced private absorption. The fact is, of course, that there is very
little room for public sector improvements in the shortterm. Large—scale
firing of redundant workers would create an overwhelming political problem.
Plant closings are of the same kind and selling inefficient, overunionized
firms runs into the obvious problem that the potential buyers might need to be
paid to take over the liability. Perhaps the best advice may be that public
sector firms should be simply given away. The problem is that the workers
might oppose even that.
The most common adjustment is a cut in or freeze of public sector
wages. This has happened in most of the debtor countries, and in some cases on
a very large scale. It does help the budget, but it presents its own problems.
The reduction in relative wages for the public sector promotes an exodus of
the wrong kind. The efficient workers leave and only those with little
alternative stay in the public sector.
In many of the debtor countries the answer to forced debt service has
almost inevitably been to increase government budget deficits, and to finance
this by issuing debt or printing money. Noney finance brings with it the25
problem of high and often extreme inflation. It is no accident that Argentina
and Brazil experienced extraordinary inflation rates in the aftermath of the
debt crisis. When deficits are financed by debt, while the imminent inflation
problem may be absent, there is still the issue of excessive debt accumulation
which ultimately poses the risk of an inflationary liquidation or a
repudiation in the manner discussed by Sargent and Wallace (1982).
There is an interaction between the foreign exchange problem and the
budget problem. The need to devalue, to gain competitiveness implies that the
value of debt service in home currency increases. A given payment of say $1
billion now amounts to more in pesos, produces a larger peso deficit and hence
gives rise to the need for increased inflationary finance. Thus devaluation is
a source of inflation not just directly via the increased prices of traded
goods and any accompanying indexation effects. It works also indirectly by
raising the required inflation tax. In the classical hyperinflations major
movements in the exchange rate were the prelude to the outbreak of
uncontrolled inflation and there is some evidence that exactly the same
process is at work in the debtor countries today.'6
The budget is also adversely affected by the problem of capital
flight. To stem capital flight, provoked by the inflationary consequences of
debt service or perhaps by an impending tax reform, the country will have to
raise real interest rates to very high levels. These high real interest rates
in turn apply to the domestic debt, causing it to grow more rapidly, and
thereby raising future budget deficits and hence the prospect of instability.
That in turn feeds to more capital flight and yet higher rates. There is thus
'6See Dornbusch and Fischer (1986) and Fischer (1986).26
an extraordinary vicious circle surrounding the sudden need to service debt
and the inability to do so through ordinary taxation.
It is worth recognizing an important trade—off in the adjustment
process. To earn foreign exchange the real wage must be cut in terms of
tradeable goods, thus enhancing competitiveness. But to balance the budget it
is often necessary or at least recommended to cut subsidies for such items as
food or transportation and that also means a cut in real wages. There is thus
competition between two targets, a cut in the dollar wage or a cut in the
tortilla wage. A choice must be made because there is only so much one can
cut. Because of the lags with which the trade sector adjusts this suggests
that the competitiveness adjustment should take precedence and that budget
balancing should follow once the economy's resources are reallocated. Since
the real depreciation by itself is already bound to produce slack there is no
risk of overheating in this sequence of adjustment.
A final point worth noting is the link between budget cutting and the
extraordinary fall in Latin American investment. The reason is that in the
category of government spending the easiest cuts are in investment. Postponing
investment and maintenance is much easier than firing workers. The resulting
impact on aggregate investment is so large because the public sector, in the
form of public sector enterprises, accounts for a large part of total
investment, and because the public sector was in the forefront of adjustment.
It is immediately obvious that this is a very ineffective means of adjustment,
failing to recognize the distinction between the public sector's current and
capital accounts.27
Case Study: Mexico
Mexico illustrates in a very striking way many of these issues. The
least noted fact, apparent in Table 11, is the dramatic shift in the budget
over the past three years. The noninterest or primary budget has improved by
more than 7 percent of GD?. From a deficit of nearly four percent of GD? in
1982 the noninterest balance has shifted to an estimated surplus of 3.2
percent in 1986. The improvement is all the more impressive in view of the
large decline in oil revenue in 1986. Note that the whole improvement in the
noninterest budget went to finance increased interest payments on the domestic
and foreign debt.
Table 11 Mexico's Budget
(Percent of GD?)
1982 1983 1984 19851986*
Budget Deficit 17.1 8.9 7.7 8.4 15.8
Primary Deficit 3.7 —5.2 —5.4—4.2 —3.2
Operational Deficit n.a. —0.2 —0.7—0.9 —2.1
Public Investment 9.3 6.6 6.5 6.1 5.1
*estimate
Source: Mexico, Presidencia de la Republica and Secretaria de Heacienda y
Credito Pubico
The total budget records a deficit of nearly 16 percent of GD? for
1986. The increase in interest payments is largely a reflection of inflation.
Inflation and the accompanying exchange rate depreciation raise the nominal
interest rates required to make Mexicans hold the depreciating asset. These
interest rates in turn translate into a large interest bill in the budget.28
There is a budget deficit because there is inflation, not the other way
around.
Table 12 shows further details on the Mexican macroeconomic situation.
We already saw the cut in public sector investment. The table shows that total
investment shows a sharp decline, leaving little net investment.
Table 12 Mexico: Macroeconomic Indicators
1970—81 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986*
Per Capita Growth 3.5 —2.8 —7.5 1.4 0.4 —6.3
Inflation 17 99 81 59 60 100
Investment/GDP 23.6 21.1 16.0 16.3 16.9 14.9
Real Wage (1981=100) n.a. 105 76 73 67 n.a.
Current Account/GD? —3.5 —3.8 3.8 2.5 0.3 —2.6
External Interest/GDP na 7.5 7.1 7.0 6.0 6.4
Price of Oil ($US/barrel) 12.4 28.6 26.4 26.8 25.4 11.2
*estjmate
Source: INF and Secretaria de Hacienda y Credito Publico
Consider next the current account. There is a striking turn—around,
from the deficits prior to the crisis to surpluses afterwards. In 1983—84 the
surpluses were enough to help finance capital flight and also meet the
interest payments. In 1985 interest was paid out of these surpluses, and by
attracting a reflow of private capital via very high interest rates. But with
the oil price decline the external financing problem returned, forcing a
choice betwen further real depreciation, and an alteration in the terms of
debt service.29
The real exchange rate and the real wage both declined sharply in the
past few years. Real wages today are 40 percent below their 1980 levels and
the external competitiveness has improved by 40 percent. These are
extraordinary adjustments for any country to make. Finally there is the
employment story. The labor force is growing at 3.5 percent per year, but
employment after an initial decline has been entirely stagnant over the past
four years. The informal sector and migration to the U.S. were the main shock
absorbers in employment. Thus unemployment is growing and thus so too is
social conflict. The lack of employment growth, even after so extreme a real
depreciation, is an issue of major concern. It suggests that depreciation
reduces employment for quite a while before the substitution takes over.
Early results for trade were disappointing. More recently Mexico has
started to build up a strong non—oil export growth. But that has turned out to
be a mixed blessing. US trade concerns have spilled over to Mexico in the form
of more than 100 countervailing duty cases!
Case Study: Brazil
Brazil, just like Mexico, started off her adjustment with a large
decline in per capita income and with a sharp acceleration of inflation. The
inflation acceleration is largely due to the real depreciation required to
generate a noninterest surplus. The presence of indexation translated exchange
depreciation into an increase in inflation. The higher inflation in turn
showed up in a sharply larger budget deficit. (See Table 13)30
Table 13Brazil: Macroeconomic Indicators
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986*
Inflation 99 142 197 227 n.a.
Per Capita Growth —1.3 -5.5 2.3 6.1 6.8
Budget Deficita
Actual Deficit 16.7 19.9 22.2 27.1 10.9
Operational Deficit 6.5 3.0 1.6 3.5 5.1
Current Account Deficita 8.5 3.5 — 0.1 —0.1
External Interest 6.5 5.3 5.4 4.7 3.7
Noninterest Deficit 2.0 —1.8 —5.4 —4.6 —3.6
a Percent of GDP.
Source: Banco Central do Brasil
The noninterest external balance improved sharply. This is seen in
Table 15 in the shift of the noninterest current account from a deficit of 2
percent of GDP in 1982 to a 3.5—5 percent surplus in 1984—86. In contrast to
Mexico the Brazilian budget has not improved sharply. That meant more stimulus
to growth and to recovery.
The difference between Mexico and Brazil, in 1986, is both oil and
macroeconomics. Lower oilprices in Brazil's case more than compensate for the
adverse conditions of the boom on the external balance. But the external
balance is certainly also improved by the import substitution and export
capacity expansion made possible by the investments of the early 1970s, which
came on line just in time to help service the debt.
5. BANK EXPOSURE AND THE QUALITY OF DEBTS31
In this section we review the debt problem from the side of commercial
bank creditors. We look at the extent of exposure and at the quality of debts.
Exposure:
Table 14 gives a broad overview of loans by US banks to regions other
than the industrial countries or offshore banking centers. In these categories
Nigeria and Venezuela are included among the Opec countries while Mexico is
part of the Non—Opec countries.
Table 14 U.S. Bank Claims on Non-Industrial Countries
(Billion $)
Year Opec Non-Opec Eastern Europe
1977 14.3 45.0 7.0
1982 23.2 101.9 6.6
1985 20.4 100.9 5.1
Source: Federal Reserve
Between 1977 and 1982 claims on Non-Opec countries more than doubled.
By contrast, since then there has been a complete standstill in lending. The
table shows that loans to Eastern Europe are small and relatively stable in
size. Exposure to Opec countries is more sizeable and has declined since 1982.
Table 15 looks at lending to non—Opec developing countries, this time
disaggregating by size of bank. We also show how these claims have evolved
relative to equity capital.32
Table 15 U.s. Bank Claims on Non-Opec LDCs
All Banks 9 Major 15 Major All Other
Total Claims of U.S. Banks ($Bill.)
1978 52.5 33.4 9.9 8.9
1982 101.9 61.5 20.6 19.8
1985 100.9 63.5 19.8 16.9
Percent of Capital
1978 110 163 107 57
1982 154 227 162 75
1985 99 156 99 41
Source: Federal Reserve
Three conclusions emerge from Table 15. First, debt is a "big bank"
problem. More that 60 percent of total debt is owed to the major money center
banks, and nearly 85 percent to only 25 major banks. Second, small banks have
managed to to reduceng their claims over the past three years by 15 percent.
Third, all banks and in particular the money center banks have been able to
reduce their exposure measured as a percent of capital. The exposure reduction
has occurred primarily via a build—up of capital, in part by issueing equity
commitment notes. But in part the exposure reduction is due to sell—off of
loans, write—downs, and simply due to a slowdown or actual halt in new money
commitments.
To judge the implications of LDC problem debts for the banking system
we look in Table 16 at the group of most heavily indebted countries. For
simplicity we take all of Latin America (including Venezuela) plus Nigeria,
Phillipines, Morocco and Yugoslavia. The total exposure in 1985 was close to
$100 billion and approximately 90 percent of bank capital. Thus, in the33
extreme situation of all these debtors repudiating their debts completely bank
stock holders would be largely, though not altogether, wiped out while
depositors are left fully intact. That picture is more favorable than much of
the public discussion of the 'IDC debt bomb' might lead one to believe. Of
course, this point holds only in the aggregate and thus is not very revealing.
The more revealing comparison disaggregates by bank size. In this case it
becomes apparent that their exposure is far in excess of their equity. Brazil,
Argentina and the Phillipines alone (to take the 1987 major confrontation
cases) account already for more than half of the capital of major banks.
Table 16 U.S. Bank Exposure to Problem Debtors: 1985a
(Billion $andPercent of Capital)
All Banks 9 Major 15 Major All Other
(Billion $)
LatinAmerica 80.4 60.5 16.0 15.2
Other Debtors 12.6 8.8 1.9 1.2
(Percent of Capital)
Latin America 78.9 148.6 80.0 36.9
Other Debtors 12.3 21.7 9.5 2.9
Source: Federal Reserve
The second point worth noting is that even Latin America's debt is to
a large extent held by non—U.S. banks. The Bank for International Settlements
reports Latin American debt to banks in the reporting countries of $160
billion in 1985. Table 18 shows that only about one half of that debt is owed
to US banks. For the remaining problem debtors the BIS total is $37 billion.
In their case the U.S. loans are thus only one third of the total of exposure
to banks in the U.S. and elsewhere.17
'7See Bank for International Settlements International Banking and
Financial Markets Developments, October 1986.34
There is an important difference, though, between European and US
banks. During the period of dollar appreciation European banks were forced to
increase their reserves against dollar loans. Furthermore these loan
provisions were facilitated by tax advatages. Since 1985 the dollar has
depreciated significantly and this has worked to further increase European
loan loss reserves relative to their claims. As a result European banks are
said to have, in some instances, been able to set aside loan loss reserves to
fully cover problem debts. This, of course, is far from being the case for
U.S. banks.
The Quality of Debts:
In the 19th century and until World War II, LDC debt mostly took the
form of bonds traded on organized markets and widely held by the public. The
post—war debt, by contrast, is owed to official institutions and commercial
banks. Accordingly there are no good price quotations that might be used as a
measure of the qualtity of debts. Very little of claims on debtor LDCs takes
the form of bonds.18 But for some time bank claims on various LDCs have been
swapped between banks, sold outright between banks, and are now even being
sold to non-banks. The market has become central to discussions of debt—equity
swaps. In these transactions, further discussed below, purchase of discounted
debt is the starting point for a foreign investment in a debtor country.
Table 17 shows the average of the bid and offer price in the
secondhand market. It would be a mistake to believe that all debts are
'8There are a few public sector bonds oustanding. Edwards (1985) and
Dornbusch (1986) look at the yields of Mexican, Argentine, Venezuelan
and Brazilian bonds.35
actively traded. But even so the prices provide some indication of market
valuation.
Table 17Market Price of Problem Debt: December 1986
(Billion $andcents per dollar)
Country Total Debt Debt to US Banks Pricea
Argentina 50.8 8.4 66.0
Bolivia 4.0 0.1 7.5
Brazil 107.3 22.2 75.5
Chile 21.0 6.5 68.0
Colombia 11.3 2.2 86.5
Ecuador 8.5 na 65.5
Ivory Coast 8.0 0.4 77.0
Mexico 99.0 24.2 56.5
Morocco 14.0 0.8 69.5
Nigeria 19.3 0.9 39.0
Peru 13.4 1.5 19.0
Philippines 24.8 5.1 73.5
Uruguay 3.6 0.9 66.5
Venezuela 33.6 9.7 74.5
Yugoslavia 19.6 2.2 79.0
Weighted Average 67.1
aAverage of bid and offer price in cents per dollar debt.
Source:Dealer Information
There are quite extraordinary divergences in prices. Bolivia, Peru and
Nigeria have low valuations. But perhaps more interesting is the difference
between Mexico and Brazil. Why is Brazil thought to be a so much better credit
risk than Mexico? The major difference would have to be between being an
exporter and an importer of oil. The average price of problem debts is 67
cents per dollar. Discounts of 25 percent and more, suggests that these are
indeed problem debts, and that the prospect of a return to voluntary lending
might be very remote.36
However, story is not that simple. Consider the case of Uruguay. The
country's debt stands at a discount of 23.5 percent, suggesting that the debt
is poor. Yet, in the fall of 1986 Uruguay issued a long-term public sector
bond at the same rate as the U.S. Treasury. This would suggest that the large
discounts reflect above all a market that is too narrow, so that it is
illiquidity of banks which dominates in depressing the prices.
6. US TRADE EFFECTS OF THE DEBT CRISIS
There is considerable difficulty in allocating the deterioration of
the U.S. external balance between competing causes: the overly strong dollar,
the rapid domestic growth relative to that abroad, the budget deficit, and the
turn around forced on debtors' trade balances by the need to service external
debts.
Table 18 gives some indication of the shift in our trade with Latin
America. Not all of this can be attributed to the debt crisis since our loss
in competitiveness must certainly account for some part of what happened. It
is also true that the trade figures of the early 1980s are inflated by Latin
America's overvaluation and spending spree. But even so it is quite apparent
that there was a major shift in the bilateral balance amounting to $lO—12
billion from 1979 to 1985.'
19The change in the bilateral trade balance in manufactures is more
significant than the change in the total bilateral trade balance. The
reason is that declining oil and commodity prices reduce our import bill
and hence are reflected in a smaller change of the total balance.37
Table 18 U.s. Trade with South America
(Billion $U.S.)
Exports Imports Trade Balance
1979 13.6 13.2 0.4
1980 17.4 14.4 3.0
198]. 17.7 15.5 2.2
1982 15.3 14.4 0.9
1983 10.5 16.0 —5.5
1984 11.0 21.0 —10.0
1985 11.0 20.9 —9.9
Source: Survey of Current Business
It is interesting to compare the evolution of Latin American trade
with different countries, to compare what happened with the U.S. This is done
in Table 19. The table shows a substantial shift toward bilateral surpluses
with respect to each of these groups. While the surplus with the US is far
larger in absolute terms, this is not the case when the change is expressed
relative to exports. This is a crude way of illustrating that the dollar
appreciation may not be so dominant in this bilateral trade balance swing.
Table 19 Latin America's Bilateral Trade Balance with Various Groups
(Billion $)
U.S. Japan EEC Industrial Countries
1980 —3.4 —2.4 2.8 —4.2
1985 10.8 0 7.7 18.7
Change as
% of Exports 42.9 54.8 20.8 35.1
Source: INF Directions of Trade Statistics38
If $10 billion is taken as the change in the bilateral trade balance
then, even attributing all of this to the debt crisis, one does not come up
with much damage to the U.S. After all, this is less than a quarter of 1
percent of U.S. GNP! Of course, this does not exhaust the damage and GNP is
not the proper scale variable. Other damage to U.S. trade and investment
interests occur via the depression of demand and profitability in the debtor
countries. U.S. multinationals who produce in in those countries have sharply
reduced sales and profits. Similarly there are declines in US exports of
services (other than interest) to debtors. There are no ready estimates of
losses in service exports.
In judging whether a $10 billion deterioration in the trade balance is
a large one must bear in mind two points. First, the swing in the trade
deficit helps facilirate a non—inflationary absorption of our budget deficit.
Switching lending from LDCs to the US Treasury helps finance our own deficits
under better (short—term) macroeconomic conditions. But there is clearly a
cost for the affected industries. A large share of the trade deterioration,
for example is in the capital goods sector as Latin Americas decline in
investment reduced our exports. For this sector the trade deterioration with
Latin America is, of course, far above the one quarter of one percent of
income. But even so it would be difficult to make the debt crisis the main
reason for our $150 billion trade problem.39
7. SOLUTIONS TO THE DEBT PROBLEM ?20
The ordinary aftermath of imprudent borrowing and adverse
international conditions, as in the 1920s and 1930s most recently, is to cause
debt default. Debts are normally written down, or simply not serviced for many
years. When sevicing is ultimately resumed this occurs without full payment of
arrears and often at reduced interest rates.
The major differences in the present debt crisis are two. The first is
that commercial banks and governments, rather than bond holders, are the main
creditors. A more significant difference is the fact that the governments of
the major industrialized countries have insisted on debt service and have
managed a system of debt collection, with the IMF as the chief coordinating
agent. The system avoids illiquidity by making available essential "new money"
at profitable spreads over the cost of funds to banks, and it enforces the
debts by behind—the—scenes political pressure. The creditors are efficiently
organized in this case by case approach while debtors have been unable to put
up a united front.2'
The debtors' problem, especially in the case of Latin America, is how
to gain debt relief or additional credit, so as to make available resources
for investment and develop speculation in support of the government's ability
to promote growth policies without risking financial instability. Tax reform
and improved tax enforcement is certainly of overriding importance in this.
Improved efficiency in the public sector is important, but measures to attract
20For an extensive discussion of solutions see Lessard and Williamson
(1985).
21The Mexican settlement forced the commercial banks to put up an
unexpectedly large contribution. The settlement has demonstrated that
the debt problem is not dead at all but also that government involvement
might become a boomerang.40
capital or secure relief on the external debt seem the most desirable or
practicable alternatives. We review here five possible directions of change:
an improved world macroeconomy, a facility, debt-equity swaps, a reversal of
capital flight, and Bradley—style debt—relief.
The World Macroeconomy
In 1982 the prospects of strong growth in the industrialized
countries, lower interest rates, a weaker dollar and stronger real commodity
prices were the central scenario which encouraged the "muddling through
process". This favorable scenario implied that by the end of the decade debt—
export ratios would have declined significantly. Some of these developments
have in fact occurred, and for some countries they have even been reinforced
by an unexpectedly large decline in the oil price. But the expected benefits
in terms of enhanced creditworthiness have not in general appeared. It is true
that South Korea is certainly at present not a problem debtor, but Brazil
clearly is and so are many other countries.
Looking ahead to the next few years, what macroeconomic developments
can be expected and how will they affect the debt situation? The most
important development for the world economy is US budget balancing. There are
basically three scenarios. In one case rapid budget cutting is accommodated by
monetary expansion in the U.S. and in the rest of the world. In this setting
interest rates decline sharply, growth is sustained and the main exchange
rates between industrial countries remain unaltered. This is a highly
favorable scenario for LDCs in that much lower interest rates implicitly
transfer to them resources in amounts far in excess of what can be expected
from creditor country taxpayers.41
The second scenario envisages the same budget cutting, perhaps more
spread out in time, but without monetary accommodation. In that case interest
rates decline, somewhat but there will be a world recession. Most debtors
would not benefit, or at least very little, since the lower interest rates are
offset by slack in their export markets.
A third scenario envisages a hard landing: budget cutting and a flight
from the dollar that forces the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to
stem the inflationary impact of depreciation. Such a development would
certainly bring about systenwide illiquidityy and likely default.
The world macroeconomy does hold out some promise. A Gramin—Rudman—
Hollings budget cut, soon and with worldwide monetary accommodation, would
make a major advance toward solving the debt problem. But for the time being
there is not much of a sign of either the budget cutting or the monetary
acconmodat ion.
Debt-Equity Swaps:
The debt problem has two aspects. The first is that debtors
cannot service their debts as contracted. Moreover, the interest they pay
comes largely at the expense of much needed investment in their economies.
Thus debtors have a resource and investment shortage. On the lenders side
small banks are tired of the acrobatics involved in debt collection. They want
to avoid yet another round of rescheduling. But there is no money in the
debtor countries to pay them off, nor can the large banks do so, given their
already extravagant exposure. These twin problems strain the skills of
regulators, accountants and policy makers world—wide.42
The poor quality of LJDC loans can be judged by the discount at which
they trade in the emerging second—hand market. The large discounts suggest
that an imminent return to voluntary lending is highly unlikely. Creditors'
attention is therefore shifting to new ways of liquidating debts without
taking outright and massive losses on the entire portfolio. But if banks are
to get out, who will get in?
Debt—equity swaps have emerged as a seemingly attractive solution to
the debt problem. Clearly not the solution, but a sound contribution with all
the rings of free enterprise.22 Their apparent merit is in solving two
problems at once: they allow banks to sell off loans without a massive decline
in loan prices, debtors can reduce their external debt and at the same time
pull in foreign investment. All things considered, they appear to be a good
idea. But there are reasons for scepticism. Before turning to these
objections, a qualification is important. There should be no doubt that debt—
equity swaps agreed between private firms and their commercial bank creditors
(without government intervention or subsidies) are entirely appropriate.
Likewise there cannot be any objection to direct foreign investment. On the
contrary, there should have been more in the past, and the more there is in
the future the better. The objections raised here concern exclusively the use
of an already strained debtor budgets to grease the wheels.
The basic difficulty is that debt—equity swaps amount to a budget
subsidy by debtor countries that will let banks get out and foreign investors
get in. Here are the mechanics: First Regional Bank sells Brazilian government
bonds at a discount to Dreams, Inc., a U.S. firm specializing in services.
22For a strong statement of support for debt-equity swaps see the Morgan
Guaranty World Financial Markets issue of September 1986.43
Dreams,Inc. presents the debt to the Banco Central do Brasil to be paid off in
cruzados. The proceeds are used for the purchase of a Brazilian firm. It
seems that everybody gains: the bank has found a way of selling some its
illiquid portfolio without depressing the second-hand market the investing
firm gains the advantage of buying cruzados at a discount and Brazil gains
because she can pay the foreign debt in local currency rather than in dollars.
Moreover, much needed investment takes place.
The debtor government will have to finance the repurchase of debt from
the foreign investor. One cannot simply print local money to pay. In fact the
government will issue domestic debt and use the proceeds tobuy back its
foreign debt as it is presented by the foreign investor. Hence, when
everything is done, the government has a reduced external debt, but a matching
increase in domestic debt. The country owns less of its capital stock, since
the foreign investor will have bought some, and in return has redeemed some of
its external debt.
Is there any advantage for the budget? In the budget there will now be
reduced interest payments on external debt offset by increased domestic debt
service. There is a net reduction in interest if the debtor country can
appropriate most of the discount at which the external debt is traded and if
the real domestic interest rate (in dollars) is not too high relative to the
cost of servicing the external debt. The net result is likely to be an
increase in debt service, because real interest rates in debtor countries are
exceptionally high.
On the balance of payments side, however, swaps might seem to be good
news: foreign debt is reduced and as a result burdensome interest payments to44
abroad come down. But the reduced external interestpayments are matched, at
least potentially, by increased remittances of dividendsor profits by the new
foreign owners of the national capital stock. Hence, on thepayments side
the trick also does not do much good. In fact, thecountry becomes less liquid
since it is much easier to control the service of bank debtthan the
remittances of multinationals. The massive outflow of remittancesfrom Brazil
in 1986 makes this point.
Debt-equity swaps are primarily a balance sheet operation, not a net
rersource transfer. One might argue that the government could target deals to
make them less a transaction in existing assets and instead bedirected toward
new, extra investment. 1ore likey, financial intermediaries will look for
firms, domestic or foreign, who are already investing. They willapproach
them with a new kind of financing package involving debt—equityswap which,
because of an implicit subsidy by the government turns out to be lesscostly
than alternative sources of finance. Thus debt—equityswaps will finance
investment, but they finance at the budget cost of a subsidy investment that
would have taken place anyway. This explains the reluctance of debtor
countries to plunge into the scheme.
Debt equity swaps bring together, with the glue of budgetpesos, two
entirely separate operations that would arise in a free, unregulated market.
To solve the banks' problem, marking—to-market of LDC debts wouldoccur and
hence debts could be sold to the non-bank public. Tocope with the resource
problem debtor countries would set up investment funds in which non-residents
can invest in the private economy with liberal facility for repatriation of
dividends. The two separate steps assure that old, bad debts do notprevent45
new investment. The bad debts are distributed more widely, though at a
possible loss to all banks' stock holders. The debtor countries gain extra
resources which they nay use to expand investment or to buy back their debt,
whichever appears more profitable. This is the market solution. Debt—equity
swaps, by contrast, are a way of nationalizing the transaction, pushing budget
subsidies to bank stock holders rather than to extra investment.
Balance sheet trick are not a substitute for gaining extra real
resources for investment. Improved government budgets in the debtor countries,
increased private saving, increased efficiency in their public sector and net
resource transfers from abroad are the only way for investment and growth to
return. Of course, debtor countries should open all doors to foreign direct
investment—— the sooner ans wider, the better. But there is no justification
for subsidizing such investment.
Reversal of Capital Flight:
Wishful thinking turns to the $100 billion or more of Latin American
assets that have fled from financial instability and taxation to the
industrial countries, especially the U.S. Reversing these capital flights,
primarily in the case of Mexico or Argentina, would make it almost possible to
pay off the external debt. The reason is that much of the debt was incurred in
the first place to finance the exodus of private capital.
Estimates of the amount of capital fliught in the 1970s and early
1980s differ widely. But whatever the methods by which the magnitudes are
estimated, the fact of at least a $100 billion capital flight from Latin
America is not in question. Estimates are particulary large for Mexico,4.
Argentina and Venezuela and much smaller for Brazil or for Chile. For both
Argentina and Mexico estimates of $25 to $35 billion dollars are not uncommon.
Hence the suggestion that reversing the mammoth outflow could help pay off the
debt without tears.
The idea that private capital could be the main solution, or at least
provide an important contribution, is naive. There is little historical
precedent for a major reflow and when it does happen. It is the last wagon of
the train. Einaudi once observed that savers "have the memory of an elephant,
the heart of a lamb, and the legs of a hare". Capital will wait until the
problems have been solved; it will not be part of the solution and is even
less likely to provide a bridge head.23
It is often argued that if only countries adopted policies
guaranteeing savers a stable positive real rates of interest rthere would be
nocapitalflight problem. But that argument is not very realistic in three
respects. First, in the context of adjustment programs devaluation is often
unavoidable. Compensating savers for the loss they would have avoided by
holding dollar assets would place a fantastic burden on the budget which in
turn would breed financial instability. Second, maintaining high real interest
rates poses a serious risk to public finance. The public debt which carries
these high real rates snowballs, and that in turn is a source of instability.
Third, it is a very bad habit indeed to raise the return on paper assets above
the prospective return on real capital. That is terrible supply side economics
which ultimately erodes the tax base, and deteriorates the financial system by
23The public opinion survey on Mexico reported in the New York Times on
November l6th,1986 makes most amply apparent just how pessimistic
nationals of debtor countries are about the chances of economic
recovery.47
souring loans. A country in trouble simply cannot make its chief priority
keeping the bondholders in place.
Capital controls, where feasible, are a better strategy for restoring
order in public finance than papering over extreme difficulties for a while
using extraordinarily high real interest rates. The latter strategy was,
indeed, at the very source of the mess in Argentina under Martinez de Hoz and
explains some of the difficulties in Mexico today.
It is also worth recognizing that the capital flight problem is
encouraged by the fact that the U.S. Administration no longer witholds taxes
on nonresident assets. For with this tax—free U.S. return, anyone investing
in Mexico (and actually paying taxes there) would need a yield differential,
not counting exchange depreciation and other risks, of several extra
percentage points.
There is much talk about the problems of banks putting in new money
only to see it used by debtors like Mexico to finance capital flight. Of an
extra dollar of new money conceded by creditors 70 cents are said to leave in
extra capital flight. That indicates the need for a cooperative approach where
debtor country governments, the tax authorities in creditor countries and the
commercial banks cooperate in stopping capital flight and tax evasion. Of
course, none of the three parties can succeed alone.
The Facility:
A number of proposals have been made over the past four years by
academics, business leaders and politicians in an attempt to drive a wedge
between old, bad debts and the recognized need for new investment in debtor48
countries. Old debts are seen in this context as oversized mortgages on the
debtor countries that impede the free and voluntary flow of new funds. The
means to achieve such a flow is a facility that buys up LDC debts from banks,
and reduces debt service costs for debtors.24 Lightening the burden of old
debts and using an international fund with its diversification possibilities
and possible credit standing provides important opportunities for passing on
benefits to the debtors, without destructive effects on the solvency of banks
or the asset position of their stock holders.
The details of such facility schemes vary. Invariably they are
adninistered by the World Bank and involve allusions to the Marshall Plan,
recycling, and the sharing of international burdens by strong currency
countries or countries with significant external surpluses. On the basis of a
capital subscription to be made by an as yet undesignated donor, leveraged by
significant borrowing in the world capital market, the facility would take L,DC
debts over from banks, or buy these in the secondhand market. Benefits to the
LDCs occur because the facility will have a lower cost of capital than the
individual LDC, both because of diversification and guarantees. The benefit of
the reduced cost of capital, and of the facility's purchases at discounts of
debts from banks would be passed on to debtors in the form of more favorable
interest rates or debt reduction.
The concept of a facility draws attention to an important practical
problem in credit markets. The higher the interest rate charged on credit the
less likely that it can and will be paid. Hence a policy of risk premia is
24The most recent proposals are the editorial by David Obey and Paul
Sarbanes in the New York Times, Nov. 9,1986 and the suggestion for a
Japan Fund made in various speeches by Jim Robinson of American Express.49
exactly that, it makes loans risky. Thus the facility would avoid this problem
by charging a common interest rate, but it would reward countries for
performance by writing—down outstanding debt.
Such a facility would introduce a new party into debt negotiations.
Concerned with the solvency and productivity of the facility the management
could take positions on rescheduling agreements to assure that the value of
the assets it carries is not impaired by extortionary settlements or
unreasonable adjustment programs. One might imagine that the facility makes
available a longterm reconstruction loan to a particular country,say Mexico,
and in exchange secures from the banks extraordinary reductions in spreadsor
maturities. Of course, to perform this function agressively would require that
the manager of the facility have stature and independence to be beyond the
immediate reach of the U.S. Treasury.
The main question about the facility, the issue of the donor aside, is
who should be the beneficiaries? The facility must, ultimately, involve
taxpayers money although this may occur in a highly remote, off—budget and
leveraged fashion. The use of taxpayers' money makes it reasonable to ask
whether the facility should benefit starving African debtors, middle—income
Latin America or winners such as Korea. Assigning the use of the fund
primarily to Latin America rather than to Africa whose debt is mainly to
governments and international organizations, might suggest that the facility
has overtones of a bank bailout.
Debt Relief:50
Debtor countries have failed to form an effective cartel that could
impose debt relief in the form of a write—down, sharply reduced interest
rates, generous grace periods, or the consolidation of debt into perpetuities.
On the contrary, debtor countries have competed with each other and, as a
result, have wound up with poor terms and a short leash.
There have been only two attempts so far to turn debt service into a
major political issue. One is the case of Peru, where the government
unilaterally limited its debt service to a specified fraction of export
revenue. The other is the Mexican case of 1986. In each case the large
domestic costs of debt service and the destructive effects on investment,
inflation and growth potential led the governments to try and limit the
damage. It is hard to believe that Peru got very far. But it is certain that
Mexico initiated an important change in policies and procedures. The Mexican
success suggests to some observers that with enough determination (and a
favorable geographic location) debtors can in fact secure reduced spreads,
contingency funds and even an underwriting of growth.
At the sane time the debt problem is starting to become a political
issue. Henry Kissenger, Lord Lever, Senator Bradley and an increasing number
of policy—makers and policy economists are advocating a more political
approach to the debt problem. This is the case in part for reasons of foreign
policy. But poor U.S. trade performance is also starting to seen as a
reflection of debtor countries' need to earn foreign exchange for debt
service. This point has been emphasized especially by Senator Bradley
(1986a,b) .TheBradley debt plan accordingly emphasizes the need to create a
vehicle for trade—debt discussions. Focussing explicitly on the link between51
trade concessions by debtor countries and targeted, limited debt relief this
approach consciously makes debt a political issue. Besides adapting the
regulatory system to facilitate write—downs agreed between debtors and
creditors the proposal also calls for reduced interest payments, extra money
and debt write—downs.
Several negative responses to the Bradley proposal have been voiced,
suggesting that the plan is impractical or undesirable. One argument is that
the particular details—— for example the annual debt summit—— are implausible,
complicated or undesirable. The trade issue, viewed from the perspective of
the U.S. external sector and growth is small,——there has been only a S12—15
billion swing in the bilateral balance with South America. Moreover, the
write—downs are felt to be insufficiently conditioned on performance of the
debtor countries and hence not worth making. Another criticism is more basic.
It amounts to the assertion that any and all kind of debt relief reduces or
even destroys the beneficiaries ultimate chances of renewed access to the
international capital market. Countries who accept debt relief, it is argued,
will be tainted. Only those who service humbly will see the day of voluntary
lending. Historical precedent for all of Latin America would suggest the
opposite.
Political solutions to the debt problem are likely to be close to the
arrangement Mexico secured and far away from the ambitious Bradley Plan.
Resistance to write—downs might soften, even if there is no indication of this
at present, and terms might become more flexible. But even so the debt problem
will remain an overwhelming burden on the growth prospects of Latin Anerica.
Tax payers are unwilling to underwrite Latin American growth and politicians52
are unwilling to underwrite the banks. Growth in Latin America will therefore
depend in equal parts on a solution to the U.S. deficit problem with generous
monetary accommodation, and on the introduction of reasonable public finance
in the debtor countries. With these two conditions met, and excepting extreme
episodes such as the 1986 Mexican oil decline, growth can start again,
although the losses of the 1980s will not be made up.
Debt relief can come from a direct government intervention. But it can
also come if governments withdraw from organizing the debt collection process.
}leltzer (1984) has advocated this course and Milton Friedman (1984,p.38) has
observed:
"So I think the way you solve the LDC "debt bomb" problem is to require
the people who make the loans to collect them. If they can, fine, and if
they can't, that's their problem."
There is little doubt that a withdrawal of governments (and the IMF) from the
debt collection process would lead to a rapid disintegration of the creditors'
cartel and a reduction of debts to levels more congenial to debtors.
Moral Hazard
Solutions to the debt crisis involving debt relief encounter one
apparently overwhelming objection: Latin America's debt reflects to a large
extent mismanagement and capital flight. Granting debt relief to Latin
debtors, but not to countries where management was more careful, amounts to
rewarding poor policy performance and thus invites repetition.
But a moral hazard argument can also be made in two other ways. First,
not giving debt relief means that the governments of creditor countries53
enforce bad loans. They thus encourage poor lending policies on the part of
commercial banks who now expect their governments to herlp collect even the
poorest sovereign loans.
Second, in the context of capital flight it is frequently argued that
amnesty for tax fraud and illegal capital transfers is an effective and
desirable policy for encouraging a reflow. Of course, the same moral hazard
argument applies as future tax morality would be undermined.2
The major weakness of the moral hazard argument in cases such as
Mexico and Argentina results capital flight: those who pay are primarily
workers whose real wages are cut. Owners of external assets are rewarded by
capital gains and thus turn out to be net beneficiaries of the debt crisis.
The moral hazard argument thus can be turned around to support the case for
debt relief.
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